Quote:
Originally Posted by AstralTraveller
My belief is that the bombs were not needed to make Japan surrender, nor were they dropped in vengeance. Those explosions were to show to the world in general and to the USSR in particular the might of the USA, and were the first act of the cold war.
EDIT: I hadn't seen Gary's very useful contribution when I wrote the last paragraph above. I'm still considering how that affects my position on the bombing. Perhaps it did affect Japan's surrender.
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Hi David,
Thanks for the post and stories like that of your mother-in-law bring home how
relatively recent this chapter in history is. There will be some IIS members who were
in the armed forces during the war or were part of the war effort or who were
young and lived through it.
The making of the A-bomb, the decision to drop it, the story of J. Robert Oppenheimer
and subsequent development of the H-bomb are topics I have read widely on simply
as a background interest spanning a period on and off of over 35 years. Unlike
the authors of the books I have read, I am no expert.

However, I have certainly
read a few thousand pages on the topic and distilled in my head what I see as the
salient factors that lead to the decision to drop the bombs on Japan.
Now and then in after-dinner conversation someone will raise the hypothesis that
the primary motivation was to deter the Soviet Union. Though it was a factor
that was considered by the decision makers, my distillation of the works
of authors who have interviewed these people and other witnesses does not see
the "deter the Soviets" motive as the primary reason.
The topic is large and it has many branches and sub-branches. The decision makers
were essentially a group called the Interim Committee and Harry S. Truman.
Two key players on the Interim Committee were Henry Stimson, Secretary of War,
and James Byrnes, a US Senator.
If this were a high school history assignment, in approximate order of priority,
here are my list of the salient bullet points.
This attempts to be in the context of what I've interpreted in my readings as
being important inside the heads of the actual decision makers rather than what
was the right decision to make from some strategic or moral view as an outsider.
* Motivation to build the bomb was fear Germans were building the bomb.
(US were surprised after VE Day that Germany was not even close).
* Truman had not signed off on invasion and in weighing up options would
judge them "with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent
possible the loss of American lives".
* US invasion of Okinawa - 12,500 US killed, 62,000 US casualties.
130,000 Japanese killed. Japanese were shown to be resilient and "dug-in".
Estimates for a mainland invasion of Japan varied widely but Joint Chiefs
study estimated 90 day plan would result in 456,000 US casualties including
109,000 dead. Study done by Stimson's office estimated 400,000 to 800,000
US deaths and five to ten million Japanese in protracted war with civilian population.
Japanese diplomats made some communications via the Russians and Stalin
conveyed to Truman that the last of these said that Japan would "fight to the death
rather than accept unconditional surrender".
* Precedent of bombing of cities involving large numbers of civilian casualties
had already been set. It was found that in successive waves of Allied bombers, crews
had a habit of dropping their bombs a little earlier than the previous wave so they
could get out of their quicker. This phenomena was referred to as "creep-back"
and it brought about the creation of fire storms on German cities and then
became incorporated into the strategy to create a city-wide conflagration with
temperatures up to 800C. Already in cities such as Hamburg, raids involving
over 700 aircraft with 40,000 casualties in a single night had become "accepted".
Tokyo firestorm 100,000 killed and a million casualties.
* US could demo bomb to Japanese at Trinity but if it did not work, decision
makers thought it might strengthen Japanese resolve.
* US could warn that they were about to hit a Japanese city with new bomb.
Decision makers considered what if they moved POWs into the city.
* Interim Committee wants industrial target. Nature of Japanese war industry is
worker's houses around factories and equipment such as small drill presses operated
by families in these houses. Interim Committee recommends to "use against
Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by worker's
homes; and that it be used without prior warning".
* Secretary of State Hull sees A-bomb as ensuring unconditional surrender will not
be compromised and that US will not require Soviet Union to aid in the Pacific.
Byrnes and Truman also not anxious to have Soviets enter the war on the
back of the Trinity test success.
* Szilard's attempts to put the toothpaste back in the tube with the petition came too
late with Roosevelt's death in April. Truman flicked him to Byrnes and Byrnes
dismissed him.
* Limited fissionable material available so psychological effect is to make Japanese
believe the US has enough to make many more bombs.
In summary, Truman's resolve to weigh up a decision whether to invade Japan
or use the bomb is primarily based on estimates of US casualties for a full-scale
invasion of the mainland.