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Yes it was.
I'm still trying to get my head around one thing, the notion that two people went from couch potatoes monitoring something which pretty much does everything for you, to fault finding while being handed more and more manual tasks with more an more master caution alerts (24 in all), with the possibly that the situation may have degraded to a point where they expected to fly a commercial jet on instruments only (zero visibility), including the possibly of extreme attitudes (inverted, tip-stalls etc), while at the same time having no indication of air-speed at all.
All the issues like not diverting, not seeing the second storm front, radar upgrades, retarding throttles, Pitots icing, Pitot replacements, flight computer shutting down, not advancing throttles to 85% in a timely manner, air-speed concerns, induced stalls, [advanced] corrective maneuvers and crew training...all of these are only contributing factors, the cause itself may well rewrite the way the future of aviation is perceived to progress...ie the mode of commercial flight.
I noticed the issue of "Design Philosophy" came up a few times (the mode)...it's now being penciled-in as a possible cause of the accident. This is huge...it's like saying the reliance of computers is inherently dangerous and businesses should look at going back to ledgers and traditional bookkeeping.
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