Ukraine
Momentum is building in some quarters of the West to ease pressure on Moscow, which has Particularly in certain parts of Europe, calls are growing to lift sanctions, restart the NATO-Russia Council, re-invite Russia to the G8, and strike a deal with Moscow that would effectively cede Ukrainian territory to Russia. These trends could help Russia in its aim of undermining the European Union and might also fray unity between Washington and its European allies. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, however, has reaffirmed her opposition to lifting EU sanctions before the implementation of a “sustainable cease-fire.”
Whether Russia and the West will reach agreement on the Minsk accords remains to be seen. Russian troops and equipment are still in Ukraine. The Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project, chaired by Wolfgang Ischinger, has offered recommendations, and the OSCE framework, currently under German chairmanship, puts forth a proposal for facilitating progress on the Minsk accords.
In addition to western policy, Russian public opinion may shape Moscow’s actions. According to a recent Levada Center poll, support for Putin’s strategy in Ukraine has dropped from 64% last summer to 45%.
Middle East
Tensions between Russia and the West have become more pronounced in the Middle East.
In our 2014 report, the North America and Europe chapters treated the Syria issue
differently than the Russia chapter. North American proponents of “deep engagement” *
with Russia pointed to U.S.-Russian cooperation on Syria as an example of how continuous U.S. engagement with Moscow could yield worthwhile deliverables. The European chapter, for its part, argued that while Russia could “meddle unhelpfully in Syria...it lacks both the will and the capacity to confront the West or to project long- range power.” Trenin’s paper, by contrast, maintained that, “an ad hoc diplomatic alliance between Russia and the United States on Syria was unlikely.” He predicted that, “Syria, Iran, and other Middle Eastern issues will be at the center of U.S.-Russian relations,” that Russia is likely to take a more active position on these issues,” and that “the Syrian civil war will negatively impact Russian-Western relations.”
Recent events support Trenin’s position. Russia is pursuing a centuries old drive to acquire access to the Mediterranean and secure a military, political and energy presence in the Middle East. To that end, Russia is waging an aggressive military campaign against the U.S.-backed Syrian opposition. Moscow’s intervention has bolstered the Assad regime and is highlighting the consequences of western inaction in the conflict.
The Syria conflict is one of several issues that have drawn Russia closer to Iran. The North America chapter of the 2014 report mentioned U.S.-Russia cooperation on Iran as a relative bright spot of the Obama Administration’s “Reset,” specifically citing Russia’s decision to ban the sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran. Again, Trenin was prophetic in his analysis that “Russia may become more sympathetic toward Tehran in its protracted stand-off with the United States and Israel.” After the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, Moscow announced that it would deliver the S-300s to Iran. Cooperation on Iran’s ballistic missile program is among the more concerning aspects of the deepening strategic ties between Moscow and Tehran.12
Turkey
Our 2014 report hardly mentioned Turkey. In hindsight, it is clear that we underestimated not only the importance of Russia-Turkey relations on global security, but also the extent to which Russia would impact the outcome of the conflict in Syria.
Tensions are running high between Ankara and Moscow after Turkey, in November 2015, downed a Russian SU-24 fight jet for violating Turkish airspace. Stoltenberg has called on Russia to “fully respect NATO airspace,” reaffirming that “NATO stands in solidarity with Turkey and supports the territorial integrity of our ally, Turkey.”
NATO policy on the current crisis could have profound consequences if it shakes Turkey’s confidence in the alliance. As the European chapter of the 2014 report warns, Turkey “might as yet be tempted to go nuclear in the absence of the NATO umbrella.”
Refugees are another source of tension between Turkey and Russia. Russia’s air campaign against the rebel-held Syrian city of Aleppo is producing a new wave of refugees into Turkey. Ankara is facing pressure from the European Union to open its border after Turkey announced that it is no longer capable of accepting more refugees.
Pivot to Asia
Russia’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific has continued, with very uneven results.13 On the one hand, falling energy prices have impeded China-Russia energy cooperation, and Russia’s development of the Far East more generally. And as the Asia chapter of the 2014 report pointed out, the China Silk Road Project (OBOR) may prove problematic for Moscow if it strengthens ties between Beijing and the Central Asian states at Russia’s expense. On the other hand, the visit in December 2015 by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the signing of sixteen agreements in defense and other strategic areas signal that Russia-India ties can endure amid tensions between Russia and the West. The fact, moreover, that the Russian energy company Gazprom secured a $2.17 billion loan from the Bank of China in March 2016 – the largest single bank credit in the company’s history – is an indicator of how sanctions are bolstering Asia as a funding alternative to the West.
Policy Recommendations
The U.S. presidential campaign has featured a wide array of views on U.S.- Russian relations. The outcomes of both the Democratic and Republican primaries remain uncertain as of this writing.
Regardless of who prevails in the elections, a return to deep engagement between Russia and the West will not, in all likelihood, be feasible so long as Russia’s global ambitions and grand strategy remain unchanged. In both Russia and the West, the debate is principally between those who favor a return to containment versus those who advocate a more transactional relationship -- selective engagement with selective containment. How far Russia is willing to go in mending fences with the West will depend, to a large extent, on how serious it perceives the United States to be in defending
the liberal world order.
We encourage the Trilateral Commission to deliberate on the basis of the following assumptions:
• The international community should uphold and defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and its right to decide on its own constitutional order. The creation of a lasting “gray zone” in Ukraine is not in anyone’s interest. The establishment of a “Friends of Ukraine” task force – an international contact group comprised of civil society – would help in facilitating economic reforms and anti-corruption initiatives in the country.
• The situation in Syria is a matter of common concern among the trilateral countries, including Russia – a reality that may allow for some degree of cooperation on the crisis. However, this cooperation is greatly handicapped by Russia’s support for President Assad, and, more generally, by its support for Iranian ambitions for regional dominance.
• Given the numerous international treaties to which Russia is a party and which oblige it to respect human rights and the rule of law, the international community has a legal right and moral responsibility to monitor the status of democracy and human rights, and hold Moscow to account whenever it falls short of full compliance with its obligations.
• Concerted efforts are needed to strengthen ties with Russian civil society. As we note in the 2014 report, “The international community can support those who feel isolated by the current government by promoting the cross-fertilization of ideas between Russian citizens and the outside world.”
• Last but not least, the trilateral countries should not allow potential differences on Russia sanctions and other issues to undermine their fundamental unity in upholding respect for the liberal international order that has preserved peace, security, and stability since the end of World War II.
2 Russia Monthly Economic Developments, World Bank, January 2016, available at: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs...ussia-Monthly- Economic-Developments-January-2016-eng.pdf
4 Anders Aslund, “What Falling Oil Prices Mean for Russia and Ukraine,” New Atlanticist, 22 January 2015, available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...l-price-means- for-russia-and-ukraine 5 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Needs a Plan C,” Kyiv Post, 16 December 2015, available at: http://www.kyivpost.com/article/cont...-c-404311.html
6 Alexey Eremenko, “Falling Oil Prices, Plunging Ruble Hits Regular Russians Hard,” NBC News, 30 January 2016, available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/business/busi...ices-plunging- ruble-hits-regular-russians-hard-n505701 7 Olga Tanas and Anna Andrianova, “Kudrin Says Russia Can Draw on Well of Social Calm for Two Years,” Bloomberg Business, 22 January 2016, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl...f-social-calm- for-two-years
8 See Kathrin Hille, “United Russia shores up defences as public mood darkens,” Financial Times, 8 February 2016, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93f2ddb4-cd9b-11e5-92a1- c5e23ef99c77.html#axzz3zkGvCTiC
* 9 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Putin’s self destructing economy,” Washington Post, 17 January 2016, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...1/17/0803598e- bb97-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html
10 To note Russia’s absence at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit on April 1, 2016
11 Michael Schmidt, “NATO to Expand Military Presence in Europe to Deter Russians,” New York Times, 10 February 2016
* 12 Boris Zilberman, “Nuclear Deal Paves Way for Iran-Russia Ballistic Missile Cooperation,” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Policy Brief, 3 February 2016, available at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media...r-iran-russia- ballistic-missile-cooperation/
13 Kathrin Hille, “Russia and China: friends with benefits,” Financial Times, 5 February 2016, available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8959...44.html#slide0